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Publication of Federal Telecommunications Law'
promises to fill a gap in the materials available to
practitioners and students of communications law-a
single, comprehensive volume bringing together information concerning disputes that have raged
throughout the industry in recent years. This collaborative effort by three attorneys deeply involved in
representing Bell Operating Companies in the proceedings on the Modified Final Judgment in the
Government antitrust proceeding against the Bell
System is scholarly, well-written, and well-edited.
The fact that the book is not as comprehensive as
its title might suggest should scarcely be surprising
in view of the obvious difficulties of being truly comprehensive. The book focuses upon antitrust matters
and those aspects of FCC regulation that interact
with antitrust. There is virtually no discussion of Title III of the Communications Act of 1934 ("Communications Act") 2 and a great deal of common carrier law is simply ignored.
The authors express very definite points of view
on many widely controverted questions. While much
of their treatment of such issues will doubtless provoke disagreement by others, the book is enhanced
by abundant footnote references that the professional
audience to whom the volume is directed can be expected to review before reaching their own conclusions. What the book does more fundamentally,
however, is to articulate and apply a "new paradigm
of unfettered competition" with reference to which
specific disputes are judged.- A paradigm is a fundamental model or pattern, ultimately not provable but

nevertheless intellectually attractive, with reference
to which concrete conclusions are drawn in a wide
range of contexts. The process by which paradigms
last for a relatively long period of time and are then
supplanted in a relatively short period is described in
the classic work by Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions.4
Federal Telecommunications Law begins by paraphrasing what it identifies as the "old regulatory
paradigm." It characterizes the old paradigm as
founded on the three pillars of a protected franchise,
quarantine of the monopolist, and cradle-to-grave
regulation. The old paradigm of a highly integrated
and tightly controlled national telephone system was
a powerful force created by Theodore Vail, the true
father of the Bell System. Vail conceived and frequently wrote about a unified system with all the
parts controlled by a single entity that would provide
universal service free of competition and would assume a paternalistic approach toward the public. In
return for its monopoly status, it would be subject to
detailed regulation. While Vail's thirst for power
paralleled that of the robber barons of the late nineteenth century, the public service ethic he also espoused distinguished his paradigm, making it more
attractive and durable.
The authors make the fundamental mistake of
equating the old paradigm with the basic requirements of the law that existed prior to the introduction of competition in the 1970s. The Communications Act did not embrace monopoly. 5 The book's
authors extrapolate from a handful of precedents in-
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hospitable to competitive entry to the erroneous conclusion that pre-1970 law mandated monopoly. In
fact, it did not. These precedents were distinguished
or otherwise overcome in the intense regulatory litigation that took place through the 1970s and resulted in the introduction of competition into the
world previously controlled by the Bell System. The
fundamental decisions allowing competition were
made under the Communications Act rather than
under the antitrust laws. The major antitrust decisions followed in the wake of the pro-competitive
regulatory decisions and addressed, not the questions
of whether competition was appropriate, but rather
whether Bell's efforts to stop competitive inroads required further remedy. The insistence by the authors
that these earlier precedents were the definitive expression of the Communications Act long after the
courts rejected such claims reflects a residue of old
Bell positions which were used first unsuccessfully to
stop competition and then later to avoid antitrust liability on the ground that-like Flip Wilson's
"devil"-the Communications Act "made" AT&T
engage in anticompetitive actions.
The book is weaker in interpreting the events of
the 1970s than those of the 1980s. The authors have
great difficulty facing the fact that the Bell System
was guilty of serious violations of law during that
period. After failing to explain the numerous and
specific allegations of antitrust misconduct so painstakingly documented on the record, the authors disingenuously try to obscure the fundamental fact that
Bell entered into the 1982 consent decree because it
recognized the overwhelming probability that it was
about to lose, and lose big. The authors instead insist
limply that Judge Greene's decision denying Bell's
motion to dismiss the suit did not reach the ultimate
merits and failed to come to grips with the implications of the prior verdicts against Bell in the MCI
and Litton private antitrust suits.
The authors speculate that dramatically different
developments might have taken place had Judge
Ritchie, rather than Judge Greene, been assigned the
Government case. A far more interesting speculation
is how differently the industry might have developed
if John deButts had not replaced AT&T Chairman
H. I. Romnes in February 1972 and proceeded, in
effect, to declare war on competition. His efforts ultimately resulted in bringing about that which he
most despised. When, for instance, he nearly drove

the "specialized" carriers from the private line business by such steps as cross-subsidizing rates for

nally only to railroads, many of which were subject to considerable competition. When its provisions were applied to telecommunications beginning in 1910 and culminating in the 1934

incorporation into a separate Communications Act, they were
applied not only to the powerful AT&T monopoly but also to
competitive international and domestic telegraph industries.

AT&T's private line services out of monopoly telephone service, and withholding and obstructing interconnections, he unwittingly caused them to redirect their efforts to a higher risk assault upon
AT&T's basic long-distance switched telephone monopoly. In a highly ironic, but quite real sense,
deButts can be viewed as the unwilling godfather of
the competitive telephone industry.
There was nothing inevitable about Bell's anticompetitive conduct. Most corporations adjust to
adverse governmental decisions without resorting to
such conduct. Romnes was apparently adjusting to
the 1971 Specialized Carrierdecision. His policy of
benign neglect toward the new competitors might ultimately have proven more effective than the all out
aggression of his successor. Entry into long distance
communications, despite AT&T's overwhelming
market share, was made possible during the period
when microwave relay was the most efficient long
distance technology. This is when the barriers to entry were the most vulnerable. When much higher capacity optical fiber became the most efficient medium, the barriers to new entry rose once again. By
repeatedly raising the ante for survival of the new
competitors and cutting off their lines of retreat,
deButts forced them to attack the larger market and
grow to a size at which they could thrive even after
optical fiber would require greater amounts of traffic
for efficient operation.
DeButts was moved, in large measure, by the old
Vail paradigm. And despite the limited support
found in the actual legal requirements of the Communications Act, the popularization of that paradigm was a powerful weapon in fighting competition. Although younger readers today may find it
hard to believe, most people twenty years ago had
really been led to believe that terrible things might
happen to telephone service if entities other than the
telephone company were allowed to insert themselves
into "the system." Defeating this popularly accepted
paradigm was, in many respects, more difficult than
disposing of the legal precedents it relied upon.
Since a paradigm is basically a subjective thing, it
is not possible to pinpoint where one becomes broken. There are, however, several points that stand
out in retrospect. Perhaps the first noteworthy break
in the paradigm occurred in Philadelphia during
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cross-examination in MCI's suit demanding local interconnections from the Bell System. Bell had made
the claim that such interconnection would damage
the technical integrity of the telephone system. Questions regarding the ability to cope with alleged technical problems led to inquiry as to whether the hiring by MCI of former Bell System employees could
enable it to avoid damage. Finally, the witness was
asked whether interconnection could be safely made
if MCI were to hire him to supervise the operation
of its system. There was a highly pregnant pause as
the witness underwent considerable personal tension
before adhering to the company line and declaring
that it would be impossible within the organizational
structure.6 During that pause, it was clear to most
observers that Judge Clarence C. Newcomer and
others in the court room recognized that the alleged
technical difficulties were the sort of things that
could be worked out by parties at all inclined to do
SO.
The most critical event in the demise of the ancien
regime, as the authors recognize, was the Execunet
litigation' in which the courts upheld MCI's right to
furnish basic long distance telephone service and obtain the connections to the local exchanges needed to
make it work. Most of the record in the case dealt
with such issues as the taxonomic inquiry as to
whether the Execunet service, as then configured,
was more akin to AT&T switched private line or to
its basic telephone service-all of which would become irrelevant in the future. MCI's fundamental
claim was that it was entitled to provide any type of
service its facilities were capable of providing. To
Bell's claim that it alone was entitled to provide basic telephone service, MCI responded that no public
body had ever given Bell a monopoly over telephone

service. Bell was unable to respond to MCI's challenge by citing any authority for its claim of a de
jure interstate monopoly. The result of the case was
at first a very big surprise to people in the industry,
who had been so thoroughly brainwashed in the Bell
paradigm that they had failed to examine its basic
assumptions.8 In effect, someone had gotten the
nerve to cry out that the Emperor's new clothes simply did not exist. And just as in the old story, when
this was finally pointed out, there followed a general
recognition of the fact that should have been apparent all along.
Even before the Supreme Court had denied the
second set of petitions for certiorari in the Execunet
litigation, another event occurred, which although
relatively unimportant in its own right, shed light on
shifting subjective attitudes toward the old paradigm.
It occurred in an oral argument in July 1978 before
the Commission on whether the costs of Bell's institutional advertising should be recovered in charges
imposed upon customers. Counsel for MCI held up
a two-block plastic puzzle that was capable of being
fitted together as a pyramid and had been distributed
at shopping malls in the Washington area as one
step in the major advertising campaign Bell was then
conducting. The puzzle claimed to illustrate the
point of the campaign that "The System is the Solution." In demonstrating how the plastic puzzle was
being used to sell the proposition that the Bell System should not be tampered with,9 counsel for MCI
introduced into the otherwise solemn event a degree
of gentle mockery at the advertising claim that went
far beyond the technical question of rate regulation
nominally at issue. While AT&T's very able counsel'" was shrewd enough to ignore the undertone and
explained instead that the puzzles had been distrib-

6 MCI Communications Corporation v. AT&T, (U.S.D.C.

A small card distributed with the puzzle explained:
The parallel to the Bell System is obvious. Western
Electric, Bell Labs, Long Lines, AT&T, and the operating companies form a unified structure that has demonstrated its strength and function. It has provided an extraordinary record of planned innovation, and genuine
reliability in an age of unreliability. Like the pyramid in
this envelope it is deceptively simple and the temptation to
alter its simplicity is undeniable.
As you struggle with this puzzle think of the difficult
road back should the Bell System ever be broken up.
Time, energy, and resources would be wasted in a fruitless effort to improve that pyramid of telecommunications
- the Bell System. It Works.
Comments of MCI Telecommunications Corporation, Microwave Communications, Inc. and N-Triple-C Inc. of July 7,
1978 in FCC Docket No. 19129.
10 Several years later, as AT&T's General Counsel, he was
to approve the compromise embodied in the Modified Final

E.D. Pa.) Civil Action No. 73-2499, Transcript of Hearing on
Request for Preliminary Injunction, November 16, 1973, Testimony of Richard Hough, pp. 328-41; Decision at 369 F. Supp.
1004 (1974), vacated on primaryjurisdictiongrounds, 496 F.2d
214 (3d Cir. 1974).
' MCI Telecommunications Corporation v. FCC, 561 F.2d
365 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978), mandate
enforced, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
980 (1978).
8
Curiously, while the authors recognize the "profound implications" of the Execunet decisions, they nevertheless reflect
the shock with which their clients initially greeted the decisions
by referring to them as "dubious as a matter of law" and
"poorly reasoned." KELLOGG, THORNE & HUBER, supra note 1,
at 608-09. While such epithets are no doubt pleasing to the elders among their clients, they are not supported by reasoned
analysis and may suggest that the conversion to new principles is
somewhat less than complete.
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to rely on a simple paradigm to make such a case
rather than address the much more complex details
required for decisions that take adequate account of
a variety of public interest values.
The Communications Act is, at its core, a statute
rooted in the concept of equity rather than merely
economic efficiency. The common carrier scheme of
regulation was based quite explicitly on the conclusion that competition "is no safeguard against dis-

uted by employees on their own time as a reflection
of their enthusiasm for the Bell System, many in the
audience had reached the point where it was possible
to laugh at the paradigm in public.
The old paradigm is now interred. But there is a
deep-seated psychological need for a new paradigm
when an old one passes away. Federal Telecommunications Law seeks to satisfy that need. It builds on
the vividly demonstrated success resulting from the
introduction of competition into the communications
industry. It reverses the Vail paradigm a complete
180 degrees and says, in effect, competition is so perfect a solution to all problems that no other public
values should be allowed to intrude." The authors
of the book apparently came to the communications
world after the Modified Final Judgment and don't
carry the baggage that is borne by the more senior
people in their Bell clients who once subscribed to
the old Vail paradigm. The authors therefore do not
feel any need to apologize for changing so profoundly their fundamental views. This may also illustrate Kuhn's observation that the developers of
new paradigms are generally either very young or
very new to the field.' 2
The interest of the Bell Operating Companies in
promoting the new paradigm lies in their desire to
have a conceptual platform for ridding themselves of
the restrictions that were agreed upon in the 1982
antitrust consent decree, as well as various structural
requirements imposed by the FCC. It may be easier

pro quo for freedom from competition. The new paradigm, and the book that reflects it, are creatures of
the 1980s rather than of the periods over which the
statute was crafted. In the 1990s, amidst the debris
of a shattered savings and loan industry and a seriously weakened airline industry, it is far less palatable to assume that competition is a panacea justifying the complete jettisoning of every regulatory
protection for consumers.
There is no doubt that the emergence of competition is the dominant theme to describe what has
transpired in the telecommunications industry over
the last twenty-five years. That, however, does not
justify the use of the prescriptive paradigm developed
in this book as the touchstone for policy decisions on
questions that take center stage in the 1990s. Excessive reliance on a simple-minded paradigm did the
industry a great deal of damage in the past. That
process should not be allowed to repeat itself now.

Judgment that marked the end of the old paradigm.
"
The authors concede only that: "The regulation that remains will be imposed, if at all, at the interfaces of competition,
at any remaining bottlenecks such as they are, where competition alone cannot provide appropriate discipline." KELLOGG,
THORNE & HUBER, supra note 1, at 75.

supra note 4, at 90.
This was first stated in the 1886 Cullom Report, which
sets forth the fundamental basis for the initiation of common
carrier regulation. S. REP. No. 46, 49th Cong., 1st Sess, reprinted in B. Schwartz, The Economic Regulation of Business
and Industry 72 (1973).
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